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TERRORISM AND CHANGES TO THE LAWS OF 
WAR 
JOHN B. BELLINGER, III* 
Thanks, Scott, and it’s nice to be back at Duke again. I was here a 
number of years ago to open the new Center for International and Com-
parative Law and again last year. It is great to be back, and I thank the or-
ganizers for putting together this panel. 
I am going to begin my remarks by placing this discussion in a policy 
context since I am the person most recently out of the government. First, I 
will address what has changed in the last year under the Obama administra-
tion and what has not changed. Then I will focus within that policy context, 
more specifically, on the issues for this panel regarding use of force, in-
cluding where and against whom force may be used. 
It is appropriate that we are speaking today, because exactly one year 
ago President Obama issued his famous three executive orders that made 
many changes from the Bush administration’s policies.1 The three orders 
were: one, to close Guantanamo within one year and review every de-
tainee’s status in order to determine what ought to be done with them;2 two, 
to end the CIA interrogation program and to conduct a review of what sort 
of interrogation program there ought to be;3 and three, perhaps the most 
significant and difficult to implement, to review all detainee laws and poli-
cies to determine what the appropriate legal framework should be.4 
I applauded those executive orders when they were issued and still 
think that they were good decisions. Several of us on these panels worked 
quite hard during the Bush administration to achieve the results in those 
executive orders, and it was disappointing that the Bush administration 
could not resolve some of these same issues sooner. So, as a policy matter, 
I generally agreed with the orders and believed that they did reflect some 
change. 
 
 * Partner, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, DC, and Adjunct Senior Fellow in International 
and National Security Law, Council on Foreign Relations. Served as The Legal Adviser for the U.S. 
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 1. See infra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. 
 2. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
 3. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
 4. Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
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That said, since that day a year ago, relatively little has happened to 
implement those three executive orders. First, obviously Guantanamo has 
not closed, and it looks like it will not close in 2010 because Congress has 
blocked the President’s ability to move detainees to the United States. Sec-
ond, the CIA program was officially shut down, but it had really ended 
years ago. Moreover, as you may have seen in the press just a couple of 
days ago, the director of national intelligence is already bickering with the 
director of the FBI about who ought to conduct interrogations and whether 
the intelligence community should be allowed to do more robust interroga-
tions. 
Finally, the third executive order created a task force that was to re-
view detention policy overall, but the task force missed its six-month dead-
line and extended the deadline to a year. The task force should have re-
ported by now, but has not done so in large part because the issues are so 
difficult. 
So those are the things that have changed. What I would like to focus 
on now is what has not changed. That is the remarkable thing: that there 
has been, in fact, more continuity than change between the Bush and 
Obama administrations. 
The main point is that the legal framework that the Obama administra-
tion is applying continues to be a law of war framework. The President 
dropped the label of “a Global War on Terror,” and I think this was a good 
idea because this label did more harm than good. But he is still pursuing, as 
a legal matter, a global war on al Qaeda and, most significantly, he is ap-
plying the laws of war for detention and for targeting. In his famous Ar-
chives speech, he emphasized that the United States is at war with 
al Qaeda,5 and under some pressure from Republicans recently, has had to 
repeatedly say, “We are at war. We are at war against Al Qaeda . . . .”6 
What that means is that he continues to rely on the laws of war as the legal 
basis for our military and our CIA to kill alleged terrorists around the 
world. He uses these laws to detain people indefinitely, without trial, and to 
assert the right to detain people even though they have not been charged 
with any crime. 
Furthermore, he has emphasized that it is not the criminal laws that 
apply, but the Law of Armed Conflict. He has asserted a right to detain 
 
 5. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21, 2009) 
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-
National-Security-5-21-09/). 
 6. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Strengthening Intelligence and Avia-
tion Security (Jan. 7, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-strengthening-intelligence-and-aviation-security). 
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people not just in Afghanistan, where there are active hostilities taking 
place, but essentially anywhere in the world. 
With respect to the prosecutions of those individuals whom the United 
States is detaining who can be tried, the administration has said it will try 
many of them in military commissions. The attorney general announced in 
November that he will try the 9/11 planners in federal court in New York.7 
I personally think it is a good idea to try the 9/11 planners in federal 
court—those people had, in fact, clearly committed federal crimes. But to 
the great consternation of many of the President’s supporters who thought 
that he was going to immediately jettison the military commissions, the 
President has said that he is going to retain them. I think he made this deci-
sion largely because he has found that many of the Guantanamo detainees 
cannot be tried in federal court, not because of any way that they have been 
treated, but because they did not violate our federal criminal laws. The 
things that many of the detainees had done, to the extent they were viola-
tions of law, were violations of the laws of war, not of violations of federal 
criminal law.8 Therefore, the President has continued targeting, detaining, 
and prosecuting members of al Qaeda under the laws of war. 
In addition, in a lesser known announcement last summer, the Obama 
administration said that it will continue the practice of renditions.9 Not only 
will it continue the renditions that had historically been practiced back 
through the Bush and the Clinton administrations of going out and snatch-
ing terrorist suspects and bringing them back to the United States for trial, 
but it will also use renditions to snatch an individual and transfer him from 
one country to another. That is a controversial concept and something that I 
think our allies will raise questions about. 
Finally, the Obama administration is not giving detainees much more 
process. The individuals who are being held in Bagram have challenged 
their detention and have insisted on a right to habeas in U.S. courts, even 
though they have never been in the United States and are not in Guan-
tanamo. Judge Bates, of the D.C. District Court, granted habeas rights to a 
limited number of non-Afghan nationals.10 That case was just argued on 
 
 7. Attorney Gen. Eric Holder, Announcement of Forum Decisions for Guantanamo Detainees 
(Nov. 13, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech 
09113.html). 
 8. See Scott L. Silliman, The Appropriate Venue for Trying Terrorist Cases: Prosecuting Alleged 
Terrorists by Military Commissions, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 289 (2009). 
 9. See David Johnston, U.S. Says Rendition to Continue, but With More Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 24, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/25/us/politics/25rendition.html. 
 10. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, Nos. 09-5265 (D.C. Cir. 
May 21, 2010). 
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appeal before the D.C. Circuit. The point here is that the Obama admini-
stration is opposing habeas rights for anybody outside of Guantanamo.11 
My point overall is that the legal framework the Obama administration 
is applying continues to be the laws of war. I think the Obama administra-
tion has found that to fight al Qaeda, particularly with hundreds of thou-
sands of our troops around the world, one simply cannot apply exclusively 
a human rights law or criminal law framework. 
What are the implications of this around the world? When I became 
the State Department Legal Adviser, I began a dialogue with our allies to 
try to do a better job of explaining the legal rationale for U.S. policies, be-
cause our allies obviously felt that many, many mistakes were being made. 
The Obama administration is going to need to continue this dialogue. There 
is going to be a honeymoon period during which the allies will be very 
happy with the initial executive orders and the tone that the administration 
is adopting. But, as the Administration continues many of the Bush admini-
stration’s unpopular policies of indefinite detention without trial, rendi-
tions, and military commissions, our allies will then have one of several 
choices. They can hold their noses and look the other way because they like 
the new administration. They can say, “Gee, these are the same policies 
that we didn’t like before,” and get back into the same head-butting with 
the U.S. administration that existed before. Or, and this is what I hope will 
happen, they will see that an administration that they like is continuing 
policies that they do not like, conclude there must be some reason for that, 
and continue a serious dialogue on these issues. I think this first year there 
has been a bit of a honeymoon, but as these policies continue, the admini-
stration is really going to have to work hard to explain the continuation of 
these policies. 
Finally, I will discuss the rules applicable to the use of force and to 
targeting. Two issues arise regarding this topic: first, where can you use 
force, and second, against whom can you use force? Both of these were is-
sues that were extremely difficult for the last administration, and the new 
administration will find them equally difficult. 
First, where can one use force? If the United States is using military 
force around the world, can it only be—as some of our allies have sug-
gested—in Afghanistan, because that is really the only place where an 
armed conflict is going on? The position of the last administration, and the 
policy of this administration, is that while there are active hostilities taking 
place in Afghanistan, al Qaeda is not containing its operations to Afghani-
stan. Therefore, both the Bush administration and the Obama administra-
 
 11. Id. 
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tion are asserting the right to use force in self-defense anywhere in the 
world where the United States is threatened or being attacked by al Qaeda. 
Essentially, the Obama administration is continuing, as a legal matter, 
the idea of a global war on terror. I found in my discussions, particularly 
with Europeans, that the United States’ assertion of the legal right under 
international law essentially to use force anywhere in the world is an ex-
tremely upsetting concept. Does that mean the United States believes it is at 
war with al Qaeda in London and can shoot people on the streets of Lon-
don? Actually, it does not, because there are two competing international 
law principles. As the United States, we have the right to use force any-
where to defend ourselves, a right that is reflected in the UN Charter12 and 
under customary international law. But there also exists the countervailing 
sovereign right of every other country in the world to be free from the use 
of force by the United States.13 
In sum, the United States asserts the right to use force in the 
194 countries where it might be threatened, but then must immediately sub-
tract from that approximately 190 countries that can contain the problem on 
their own. The theory has been that the United States has a right to use 
force against al Qaeda only in those places where a country is unable, or 
unwilling, to contain the threat itself, which really results in just a couple of 
countries in the world: Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia.14 But the idea 
that the United States can use force anywhere in the world continues to be 
controversial, and it is going to require some further discussion. 
If that is not difficult enough, the even more difficult question is 
which individuals may the United States use force against specifically, 
since the United States is really not attacking these countries, but rather is 
attacking members of al Qaeda or the Taliban in these countries. The diffi-
cult thing is to figure out against whom, and under what set of rules, one 
can use force—either lethal force or detention, which is a lesser type of 
force than lethal force. 
In a traditional armed conflict, the solution is pretty clear. People wear 
uniforms; you know that they are part of an enemy army. In a non-
traditional conflict, it may still be clear that a state may target the person 
without the uniform who is coming at its soldiers with a gun, or who is set-
ting off a bomb—they would seem to be combatants. But what about the 
person who made the gun, made the bomb, delivered the gun, delivered the 
 
 12. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 13. U.N. Charter art. 2(4). 
 14. See,e.g., Harvey M. Sapolsky et al., Restraining Order: For Strategic Modesty, WORLD AFF. 
J., Fall 2009, at 84, 89-90 (arguing that the United States should only take military action against terror-
ist organizations where the “host country” cannot or will not act). 
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bomb, financed the gun, financed the bomb, or had the safe house? As this 
person’s connection to the conflict becomes more and more attenuated, the 
question becomes quite difficult. That is the core the issue: when non-state 
actors are not representing an individual country, which ones actually can 
be treated as combatants for targeting or for detention? They are essentially 
all civilians, but they are civilians who are engaging in combat. 
Human rights groups have tended to suggest that they do not believe 
that a law-of-war framework should be used in a conflict with a group of 
civilians like members of al Qaeda.15 However, I think that over the last 
eight years it has become gradually more accepted that one can be in a state 
of armed conflict with a non-state actor. Now that we see groups like al 
Qaeda that can assert force at the same level that countries assert force, a 
law of war framework is an acceptable one. But this still does not tell a 
country the proper rules to apply as far as specific people who can be tar-
geted. Neither the Third Geneva Convention nor the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention, nor even Common Article Three, advises a country as to specifi-
cally who can be targeted.16 That leaves a country with a number of 
possible legal theories. The United States is often told that the applicable 
international law is clear. But, even after eight years, it is still not clear to 
the United States or any other country what legal rules apply to targeting 
and detention issues. 
Approximately six years ago, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (“ICRC”) put together a study on civilian combatants. It is called The 
Study on Direct Participation In Hostilities, after the international legal 
rule that the only time that civilians may be targets is when they are di-
rectly participating in hostilities.17 But when is a civilian directly participat-
ing in hostilities? If civilians are shooting or bombing by day, but by night 
they go back home to their houses, are they still combatants? Or can they 
only be targeted when they are doing the bad things, not when they are 
home? 
The ICRC report spent six years studying this issue; its report is not 
binding, but reflects some useful guidance. The United States and most 
other countries agree with some parts of the ICRC report but not other parts 
 
 15. See e.g., Kenneth Roth, Human Rights Watch, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 3 (2004) (arguing that the 
category of combatant under the law of war is difficult to apply to terrorist activities where “roles and 
activities are clandestine and a person’s relationship to specific violent acts is often unclear.”). 
 16. See NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE 
NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/p0990/$File/ICRC_002_0990.PDF (noting that di-
rect participation in hostilities will suspend a civilian’s right to protection, but that “neither the Conven-
tions nor their Additional Protocols provide a definition of direct participation in hostilities”). 
 17. Id. 
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of it, but I would note that it took some of the best experts in the world six 
years to come to a consensus as to who is directly participating in hostili-
ties. However, the ICRC guidance is still not very clear. 
Therefore, inside the United States, these issues have been left to our 
courts to try to sort out. There have been a number of decisions over the 
last couple of years to clarify who is a combatant that can be detained. In 
May 2009, Judge Bates in the D.C. District Court concluded that it is per-
missible under U.S. law—The Authorization to Use Military Force18—and 
international law to detain individuals who are members or part of al Qaeda 
or the Taliban but not those who are substantially supporting al Qaeda or 
the Taliban.19 
Just ten days before this panel discussion, the D.C. Circuit, in a rather 
surprising opinion in the Bihani case, rejected this conclusion and decided 
instead that individuals can be detained if they are members or part of 
al Qaeda or the Taliban or if they are substantially supporting them.20 
Moreover, in what was perhaps the most surprising part of the ruling, the 
D.C. Circuit held that international law is irrelevant and that the only law 
the Court would look at in determining who can be detained is United 
States domestic law.21 This issue will likely have to be resolved by the Su-
preme Court, which in the next year or two will probably issue the fourth in 
its series of detention decisions to clarify who can be detained. 
In conclusion, the United States is regularly told that there are no 
problems with the law or gaps in the law with respect to detention and tar-
geting. The problem is only a question of implementation, implying that if 
the United States would just do a better job of applying the law, it would all 
be very easy. I think the answer is that this is not an easy area, that there are 
not clear rules, and that it is quite difficult to accuse someone of violating 
the law with respect to targeting and detention. One can appropriately say 
that the United States has adopted a number of bad policies, but we are go-
ing to be debating for a very long time what the applicable rules are or 
ought to be. 
 
 
 
 18. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 19. See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74-77 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 20. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 884-85 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 21. See id. at 871 (finding that reference to international law is “inapposite and inadvisable when 
courts seek to determine the limits of the President’s war powers,” and that courts must look instead to 
“the text of relevant statutes and controlling domestic caselaw”). 
